This contribution investigates the direct and indirect causal interactions between financial deepening, trade openness and economic growth for 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Using a rather general approach to identify indicators for financial deepening and to detect Granger causality within a VAR/VECM framework, we find almost no evidence for the popular hypothesis of finance-led growth. Evidence of bidirectional finance-growth causality is stronger but mostly unstable in the long run. Most results indicate a demand-following or insignificant relationship between finance and growth in Latin America. This finding seems to be consistent with regard to the weakness and deficiencies of the region's financial systems. Further, there is no evidence that finance indirectly and unilaterally induces growth via the channel of trade openness. Thus, policies that prioritize financial and trade liberalization cannot be supported by this study. Instead, a holistic policy approach seems to be preferable that promotes the determinants of both real sector growth and financial development. As a result, financial factors may positively and significantly contribute to economic development in the region. 
I. Introduction
With the emergence of the endogenous growth theory, the direct and indirect influence of financial markets on economic growth has drawn considerable attention, particularly with regard to sound development strategies. The most influential contributions on the relationship between finance and growth identify financial development as a crucial precondition of long-run growth, suggesting that financial liberalization is an important instrument of economic policy. Accordingly, financial sector reforms have been implemented in the Latin American region since the early 1990s (Herrero et al., 2000; Aizenman, 2005) . The hope was that such measures would unleash finance-growth interactions, e.g. through an increase in savings or the allure of external financing which would drive investments and ultimately growth rates (Aizenman, 2005) . However, the effectiveness of such policies requires that causality between financial deepening and economic growth runs conveniently and significantly.
The aim of this contribution is to assess whether financial deepening has actually swayed economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the past and whether liberalization strategies in this context constitute appropriate policy tools to foster development in the region. In general, we therefore test for causality between financial development and economic growth, capturing further indirect linkages between finance and growth by also scrutinizing the relationship between finance and trade openness.
The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of the theoretical considerations that form the basis of our empirical analysis. In addition, some empirical evidence is referred to. Section 3 introduces the applied methodology and data. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the causality analyses, deducing implications for economic theory and policy. Section 5 concludes with a summary.
II. Literature Review

Links between Finance, Openness and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Financial markets provide an economy with certain vital services which e.g. comprise the management of risk and information, or the pooling and mobilization of savings. In general, more ample and efficient, i.e. deeper financial systems are associated with a more effective supply of such financial services to the real sector.
From a theoretical point of view, linkages between financial and economic development may take different forms. On the one hand, the financial sector is expected to affect growth through two channels, the accumulation channel and the allocation channel. The accumulation channel emphasizes the growth-driving effects of physical and human capital accumulation (e.g. Pagano, 1993) . The allocation channel focuses on a finance-induced increase in the efficiency of resource allocation and its growth-enhancing effects (e.g. King and Levine, 1993) . In general, following these considerations causality then runs from finance to growth (supply-leading hypothesis). On the other hand, the development of the financial sector may also be stimulated by economic growth. For instance, in a growing economy the private sector may demand new financial instruments and an increasing access to external finance. Hence, financial sector activities then simply expand in step with general economic development (Robinson, 1952; Patrick, 1966) , positing the so-called demand-following hypothesis. Additionally, finance and growth may be mutually dependent. For instance, the real sector may provide the financial system with the funds necessary to enable financial deepening, eventually allowing for a capitalization on financial economies of scale which facilitate economic development in consequence (e.g. Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998) .
The latter hypothesis therefore postulates bidirectional causality between finance and growth.
1 Following views that are more sceptical towards finance-growth linkages, the financial and real sector may also be independent from each other, thereby naturally putting emphasis on other factors that may determine economic development instead (insignificant causation).
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Empirical evidence suggests that there are economies that have indeed benefited from well-developed financial systems in the past. 3 Other evidence is more inconclusive. For some of the very successful emerging market economies, finance appears to have been a crucial factor for economic success, e.g. in Taiwan (Chang and Caudill, 2005) . However, it is not always possible to identify such a strong effect of finance on growth in mature OECD countries (e.g. Shan and Morris, 2002) . For developing economies, the results are similarly diverse. Some studies find a strong impact of finance on growth (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004) , while others find the finance-growth relationship to be more complex (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Al-Awad and Harb, 2005) . In general, empirical 1 In addition, the relationship between finance and growth may also change over time as a country passes through different stages of development. In the early stages finance either leads growth but its impact on growth diminishes as an economy develops (Patrick, 1966) , or finance follows growth but eventually becomes a factor that contributes to growth after a threshold of financial development is reached (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996) .
2 In this connection, Lucas (1988, p.6) famously states: "In general, I believe that the importance of financial matters is very badly over-stressed in popular and even much professional discussion and so
am not inclined to be apologetic for going to the other extreme."
3 For long-term studies with a historic focus that emphasize the role of financial development in economic takeoff, see e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) and Sylla (2002) .
evidence strongly suggests there is a country-specific dimension to finance-growth dynamics that accounts for the frequently ambiguous results across countries.
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A potentially strong relationship between financial markets and trade opens up a further channel through which financial systems and real sectors may interact.
On the one hand, better financial systems may constitute a comparative advantage for industrial sectors that heavily rely on external financing (Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; Beck, 2003) . Therefore, countries with developed financial systems are expected to exhibit industrial and trade structures that are linked to finance-dependent industry sectors. On the other hand, increased trade openness may trigger the demand for new financial products. As argued by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) , trade carries risks that are linked to external shocks and foreign competition. Thus, more trade openness may lead to more ample financial instruments and institutions that are able to provide appropriate insurance and risk diversification. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that trade openness may also induce financial development with respect to effects from political economy. Domestic interest groups have a natural interest in obstructing financial development in order to prevent competitors from entering the market. As international competition increases, such groups shift their interests towards positive financial sector development.
Empirically, Beck (2003) shows that countries with better financial systems exhibit higher trade shares in industries that depend on external finance, concluding that finance is a crucial determinant of trade structures. Similarly, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) find that financial sectors significantly determine industrial specialization patterns across OECD countries. In general, the relationship between finance and openness has yet not been studied exhaustively. However, evidence
indicates that a nexus between the two factors indeed exists.
The interaction between finance and openness subsequently also allows for more complex paths to economic development. If finance induces openness, it may subsequently foster growth when openness is found to be a growth-driving factor. As for related mechanics, openness may induce economic growth by, among others, increasing a country's level of specialization and positively affecting innovation and technological diffusion (Harrison, 1996) . Conversely, economic development may also trigger a country's level of trade openness, e.g. with shifts in production and demand patterns as well as increased levels of international integration that accompany national industrialization experiences. 5 What is more, if increasing trade openness leads to an increase in financial development, it may promote economic growth where financial deepening is found to enhance growth via the allocative and accumulative channels, as discussed above.
Economic Development and Financial Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean
With an average per capita income growth of 1.3% between 1960 and 2000, the Latin American region has experienced comparatively disappointing economic development during the last 40 years (De Gregorio and Lee, 2004 financial sector since the early 1990s (Herrero et al., 2002) . The levels of trade openness have been similarly low.
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find that financial development and economic growth negatively correlated in the 1970s and 1980s, and that poor levels of financial intermediation impacted negatively on investment allocation efficiency.
In contrast, Nazmi (2005) 
III. Econometric Procedure and Data
General Concept
We start with a brief description of our methodological framework. We first create a composite indicator of financial deepening via principal component analysis.
Thereby, we should be able to capture developments in the financial sector in a broader sense while avoiding problems associated with multicollinearity, overparameterization and over-fitting. Second, we employ unit root and cointegration tests to identify the stationary properties and possible cointegration relationships of the investigated time series. By building on integration and cointegration results accordingly, we evade spurious regression results in the following causality analyses.
Third, we test for Granger causality in a modified framework following Hsiao (1979 Hsiao ( , 1982 , using bivariate and trivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) or vector error correction models (VECM). 6 Misspecifications within such models may lead to spurious and inconsistent results (Braun and Mittnik, 1993) . Standard Granger causality analyses may suffer from problems of arbitrary lag length selection because the considered variables are constrained to enter at the same lag length. Our procedure avoids such problems as all variables may enter at different lag lengths.
We are also able to differentiate between short-run and long-run causality. Here, we take any error correction (ECM) term estimate as evidence of a long-run causal relationship between the considered variables. However, such an interpretation is only feasible if the ECM term is negative and statistically significant (Wickens, 1996) .
When we first test for causality between finance and growth, we build on the hypotheses sketched in the previous section. That is, we try to find evidence for the supply-leading, demand-following, bidirectional causality or insignificant causation hypotheses. When we later test for causality between finance and openness, and growth and openness, we hypothesize by analogy. Thus, causality again may run in only one or both directions, or may found to be insignificant.
Data
Two standard data sources have been exploited. 7 We use annual time series observations that are absolutely sufficient to ensure the quality of our analyses, as argued by Hakkio and Rush (1991) . Level data for the individual financial institution indicators used in the subsequent principal component analysis is taken from the 7 Using data from several sources may prove inappropriate. Hanousek et al. (2007) Heston et al. (2006) . As for economic growth, the standard proxy of real GDP per capita is employed, labelled GROWTH (G). As for trade openness, the sum of exports plus imports to real GDP is utilized, labelled TRADE (T). As Harrison (1996) suggests, this measure constitutes a simple and common indicator of trade openness. 9 In the case of real GDP per capita and trade openness, GDP is measured in international US dollars. GROWTH and TRADE are taken as the differences of logarithms.
Principal Component Analysis
In related literature, several proxies for financial deepening are used, e. In the case of Colombia, a few variables are missing and therefore have to be imputed by average. 9 As suggested by, inter alia, Harrison (1996) and Edwards (1998) , a number of potentially more sophisticated measures for trade openness exist. Still, these measures raise the question of availability.
In general, we consider TRADE to be a rather rough openness indicator that however constitutes a convenient trade off between accessibility and accuracy. Choi and Chung (1995) who argue that the PP test is more powerful when low sampling frequency data, i.e. annual data is employed, compared to other unit root tests.
As reported in Table 2 , in almost all cases the PP test does not reject the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root for the data at levels, whereas in almost all cases the null hypothesis is rejected strongly when the first difference is taken. The examined time series are thus I(1) at levels and I(0) when taking the first difference, so we employ a difference filter to obtain stationarity.
11 Table 2 here
As a third step of the analysis, we test for the rank of cointegration in bivariate and trivariate VAR models, following Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) . Generally, this complex procedure involves testing how many eigenvalues of a cointegrating matrix significantly depart from zero in order to obtain its cointegrating rank. Two tests are available, namely the trace statistic and the maximum eigenvalue test. In the following, only the trace statistic is used to estimate the rank of the respective models so as to obtain more robust results (Cheung and Lai, 1993) . The test for cointegration is conducted within a VAR framework. The optimal lag length of the considered time series is chosen by the more conservative 11 In the case of Chile and Suriname where the results are not always as expected, we conduct an alternative unit root test following Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) . Here, the results generally confirm the assumption that the time series are indeed all I(1) at levels and first-difference stationary. The unexpected unit root test results may hence be mainly attributed to the comparably smaller number of observations.
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) due to its superior accuracy (Koehler and Murphree, 1988) . 12 Cointegration analyses are also conducted in all bivariate cases but not reported in order to save space. 13 We do not consider more than one cointegration relationship in our analysis, even though this may not be ruled out completely in certain cases. The relative shortness of our time series and the desire for a good interpretation of the ECM motivate this more cautious approach.
In its basic form, the causality testing procedure requires us to first consider the subsequent autoregressive process:
The sigma sign in front of L indicates the lag order of the series, L is the lag
, t u is a white noise term with the usual statistical properties, α is a constant term and β is the coefficient of the exogenous variables.
We choose the lag order that yields the smallest FPE, denoted ) 0 , (m 
Here, T is the number of observations and SSE is the residual sum of squares.
Now, we allow another variable t x to enter the model, so we receive the subsequent VAR:
Again, the sigma sign in front of L indicates the lag order of the respective series, L is the lag operator Testing for causality from t y to t x requires us to repeat the previously described steps, now with t x as the dependent variable.
IV. Causality Analysis
Model Specification
With respect to the specific conditions of our analysis, Hsiao's original approach needs to be adjusted. First, we use our results on integration and cointegration, i.e.
we employ a first difference filter to achieve stationarity and an ECM whenever cointegration evidence requires this to be applied. Second, in order to obviate the possibility of spurious causality detection, the causality procedure is conducted in a trivariate model, so we test for causality between two series, conditional upon the presence of a third. The previous discussion of possible interactions between finance, openness and growth provides the ground for such specifications. As the theory suggests interactions between all three considered series, a subsequent exchange of control variables is implemented, possibly rendering a richer picture of interdependencies between financial deepening, economic growth and openness. 
Finance-Growth Causality and Further Implications
First, we investigate the causal interaction between financial deepening and economic growth. The theory suggests that finance may either be an important or a negligible factor of economic development. As for the former, we may expect support for the supply-leading or bidirectional hypotheses. As for the latter, we may expect evidence for demand-following or insignificant finance-growth causation. Table 4 gives the results of the interaction between DEPTH and GROWTH, conditional on TRADE. The results generally show no sign of autocorrelation or multicollinearity and appear to be statistically significant and stable, especially with respect to the lag orders chosen in accordance with the causality testing procedure. Our results also fit in reasonably well with findings that financial systems play only a minor role in development processes in South and Central America due to financial sector weaknesses and inefficiencies. Any demand-following or disconnected causal relationship may support the hypothesis that a matching of financial development and the general development level has not yet been reached in a considerable number of countries. It seems that only if financial deepening corresponds to the needs of the development process will the financial sector become a growth driving factor for an economy. Such a hypothesis also corresponds with our limited evidence of any long-run finance-growth causality emerging through the ECM.
Our findings moreover suggest that recent financial liberalization which has taken place in Latin America since the 1990s had disappointing effects on economic performance because of the apparent lack of a close link between finance and growth. Thus, we argue that big push policies of financial liberalization and financial reforms should be considered carefully. The rather poor economic performance of Latin America over the past decades has to a considerable extent been due to low levels of investment and deficiencies in physical and human capital accumulation (De Gregorio, 1992; De Gregorio and Lee, 2004) . However, as discussed before, we may link an increase in financial development to an increase in an economy's accumulative capabilities and allocative efficiency. Given our empirical evidence, we may at least partially attribute low growth rates in Latin America to a deficient match of financial and real sector development. Sound economic policies should aim to sway financial development accordingly. For instance, better macroeconomic stability, improved institutional quality or a stronger focus on development-specific institutional surroundings of financial systems may influence financial deepening and financial sector policies favorably (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002; Arestis and Stein, 2005; Demetriades and Law, 2006) . Through this, over time the development of regional financial systems may correspond more adequately to real sector activities, in consequence facilitating economic development.
Finance-Openness Causality and Further Implications
Next, we look at the causation between financial deepening and trade openness. Part of the theory suggests that finance may unilaterally lead openness as a comparative advantage for outward-oriented industries, or that openness may induce financial development as a consequence of trade-associated internal and external influences. A nexus between finance and openness may additionally allow for bidirectional causality. Following more sceptical views, we may also find no evidence for significant causality between finance and openness. Still, the effects of such interactions on general economic development appear to be marginal. On the one hand, the impact of openness on financial deepening has not translated into higher growth rates, as our previous results indicate. On the other hand, neither do we find evidence of any indirect effect of finance on growth via its impact on trade openness, as shown by the results of the causality analysis for GROWTH and TRADE, conditional on DEPTH, that are reported in Table 6 . Table 6 here Mostly, the two series either share a feedback relationship or growth causes openness unilaterally. We find support for the hypothesis of a unidirectional, growthpromoting effect of trade openness only in the cases of Guatemala and Suriname, where these results are not stable in the long run.
Our findings tend to confirm studies that neglect a leading influence of openness on economic development. Furthermore, our results are also consistent with former findings that detect no significant impact of openness on growth in the presence of weak financial systems (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996) . We can additionally assert that financial development does not indirectly induce growth in a unilateral way by promoting openness which in turn positively acts on growth.
Rather, we can assess that such interactions commonly happen only feedback-wise for some examined countries, e.g. in the cases of Chile and Honduras.
More generally, our results suggest that for Latin America and the Caribbean policies that center on the liberalization of both the financial and trade sectors affect overall economic performance only to a limited extent, particularly in the short run.
V. Summary
Drawing on conflicting theoretical considerations about the causal interactions between financial deepening, economic growth and trade openness, we have tested for causality in 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries. We used principal component analysis to determine an indicator of financial deepening. Subsequently employing Hsiao's version of Granger causality within a VAR/VECM framework has several advantages which were discussed.
Our empirical findings and policy implications can be summarized as follows.
First, for Latin America and the Caribbean we detect almost no evidence of financeled growth. Second, evidence of bidirectional causality is stronger, yet appears to be unstable in the long run. Third, most results point at a demand-following or insignificant causal interaction between finance and growth in the Latin American region. We thus provide support for a more sceptical view on the finance-growth relationship. While we find some evidence that suggests interdependencies between the financial sector and trade openness, such interactions do not appear to significantly translate into enhanced economic performance. There is no evidence that finance indirectly induces growth via the channel of promoting trade openness.
In the light of our results, we question policies that prioritize financial sector and trade liberalization. Financial sector and trade development do not appear to be preconditions of economic development in Latin America. Instead, we advocate a more balanced policy approach that also takes into account other fundamental growth factors, such as factor endowments, institutions or a country's general stage of development. A combined strengthening of these growth factors may significantly alter finance-growth dynamics. Beck et al. (2000) . UMI denotes Upper Middle Income, LMI Lower Middle Income. The column DEPTH gives the value of the initial eigenvalues as percentage of the total variance the first principal component contains (percentage of variance criterion) that represents the composite indicator for financial deepening. 2.705545* Notes: (**) and (*) denote rejection of the respective hypothesis at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The test was conducted under the assumption of a linear deterministic trend. The respective lag order of the underlying VAR was chosen via the BIC, where the maximum lag length was 5, with the exceptions being Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname (maximum of 4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. FPE (m, 0, p) Notes: m, n and p denote the lags leading to the respective smallest FPE, where the maximum lag length was 5, with the exception of Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname (maximum of 4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance of the ECM at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (a) indicates an insignificant F-statistic of the respective estimation, while (b) indicates an ECM term that is insignificant or has a wrong sign. Notes: m, n and p denote the lags leading to the respective smallest FPE, where the maximum lag length was 5, with the exception of Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname (maximum of 4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance of the ECM at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (a) indicates an insignificant Fstatistic of the respective estimation, while (b) indicates an ECM term that is insignificant or has a wrong sign. Notes: m, n and p denote the lags leading to the respective smallest FPE, where the maximum lag length was 5, with the exception of Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname (maximum of 4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance of the ECM at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (a) indicates an insignificant F-statistic of the respective estimation, while (b) indicates an ECM term that is insignificant or has a wrong sign. 
Table 4. Causality Analysis for DEPTH and GROWTH
Country
FPE (m,n,p) ECM G D ⇒ i) short- run ii) long- run FPE (m,0,p) FPE (m,n,p) ECM D G ⇒ i) short- run ii) long- runFPE (m,n,p) ECM T D ⇒ i) short- run ii) long- run FPE (m,0,p) FPE (m,n,p) ECM D T ⇒ i) short- run ii) long- runFPE (m,n,p) ECM T G ⇒ i) short- run ii) long- run FPE (m,0,p) FPE (m,n,p) ECM G T ⇒ i) short- run ii) long- run
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